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A DEFINITION OF CARICATURE
AND
CARICATURE AND RECOGNITION 1
DAVID PERKINS

PART I
A DEFINITION OF CARICATURE
The existence of caricatures has proved something of a
nuisance to philosophers and psychologists bent on analyzing
pictorial representation {Gibson 1971 ). The contrast between
caricature and customary "realistic" representation poses
part of the problem. A portrait caricature clearly represents a
certain layout of spatial form, a face-like layout with nose so
long, mouth so wide, and so forth. This spatial layout
typically diverges substantially and in calculated ways from
the true form of the subject's head. What sort of picture is
this? It is deliberately inaccurate, yet the subject is often
quite recognizable- perhaps more recognizable than in an
accurate portrait or photograph. It lies about its subject's
shape, but in doing so often comments delightfully on that
shape. If conventional picturing is to be analyzed in terms of
the picture conveying information to the viewer about its
subject, then caricature is not strictly part of, but builds on,
~hat _co~vention, bending it to special purposes. What exactly
1s gomg on?
Another part of the puzzle is the variety of pictures
sometimes called caricatures, but which deviate in obvious
respects from the most typical usage of the term. Political
cartoons in general need not represent any known political
figure. Grote~ Da Vinci's famous set
{Gombrich 1961 :95) need depict no actual individual or class
of individuals. A child's cartoon monster labelled "teacher"
may offer a funny face without satirizing that teacher's
specific physiognomy. Mergings of human and animal features as in Figure 1 by Levine (1969) are a bonus: caricature
allows but does not demand such a mix.
The natural attack on these problems is a quest for
definition, a framing of conditions for caricature which
would on the one hand specify its relation to realistic
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Figure 7

- Samuel Beckett

portraiture, and on the other admit or exclude, and in any
case elaborate the relation of caricature to, the various sorts
of pictures which sometimes are so named.
Two concepts merit special attention in the search for
definition. One is exaggeration: a caricature typically exaggerates features of its subject. The second is individuation:
a caricature typically exaggerates so as to differentiate the
subject from his fellows. Exaggeration and individuation
alone promise some unscrambling of the problems sketched
above. Exaggeration seems a meaningful concept only in a
symbol system where one can also tell the truth. This might
illuminate caricature's dependence on and relation to a
tradition of realistic portraiture. Individuation commands
that the caricature remain true to the subject's physiognomy
at some level, reflecting the intuition that mere distortion, as
in the child's cartoon monster, is not caricature.
Such factors prompt a preliminary and very traditional
definition: a caricature is a symbol that exaggerates individuating characteristics of its subject. Indeed, a refinement
of this will provide the final formulation. But along the way
some major difficulties demand attention. First, prior writers
have proposed other conditions in addition to exaggeration
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION

becomes little more than a game of word substitution unless
these terms themselves can be explicated, particularly as they
relate to realistic representation. Third, it is not enough that
a definition simply stake out roughly the class of pictures
usually called caricatures. Many definitions could do about
equally well statistically, including the above, the above with
"humor" also required, or "grotesque drawings which represent real subjects." The discussion will argue that the above
definition and its elaboration, far from being arbitrary,
illuminate the essential psychology of perceiving caricatures.
FURTHER CONDITIONS?
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Prior definitions of caricature are mainly introductions,
asides and ornaments to a body of work with quite a
different focus. Most of the surprisingly extensive literature
on caricaturing deals with the evolution of the form,
biographies of caricaturists, and presentation of examples
without technical discussion. The range of art treated is
generally wider than portrait caricature, encompassing also
the political cartoon or grotesque figures. "Caricature" is
sometimes used synonymously with either of these. The
details of the relation between drawing and subject are
persistently neglected. Rarely does one even find a portrait
and a caricature of an individual side-by-side. For some
happy exceptions, see Berger (1952), Gombrich (1963),
Rother (1966).
Definitions, when attempted at all, have their favorite
vocabulary. Besides "individuation" and "exaggeration," key
words are "humor," "idealization," "defects," and "personality" as well as near synonyms of these. Whether such terms
can add to the conception of caricature sketched above
demands appraisal. The concl11sian will be that they cannot.

Humor.
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Figure 2

- Nazi caricatures of jews

and individuation; for instance, a caricature must be
humorous. On what grounds are these additional constraints
dismissed? Second, individuation and exaggeration are themselves concepts hardly clearer than caricature. The definition
2

Hum9r stands · J+-i.o.!imate relationship to caricature,
often figuring in the definitions put forth by various writers.
Proposals that caricature is the exaggeration of an individual's characteristic features to comic effect, or the like,
appear frequently (American Heritage Dictionary 1969;
Murray, quoted in Ashbee 1928:1, 25; Berger 1952: 7; Davies
1928:1). But hum~ubious as a condition for
caricature.
First of all, there are dr_awings which clearly deserve the
label but are of doubtful humor. Figure 2 from Gombrich
(1963) illustrates caricatures of Jews devised by the Nazi
propaganda effort, caricatures which are too vicious to be
funny. Commonly, one finds political cartoons incorporating
portrait caricatures which in themselves are at best very
mildly humorous. They primarily serve as reference mechanisms for the real joke of the caption or whole cartoon. It
seems strange to place the humor of the caricatured face so
much in the center of things by definition when it is often
rather peripheral to the entire comic effect. Figure 3 points
up another problem. Some artists such as James House
(Figure 3), and Oscar Berger (1952) often emphasize likeness
of personality rather than humor; the product is not
intended to prompt a laugh. Finally, there are contrast
enhancement techniques in photography and caricature-style
drawings of complex machinery (Ryan and Schwartz 1956).
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in keeping with his behavior, but can injure the likeness. All
the above considerations sum to the conclusion that humor is
best considered a contingent property of some caricatures.
If humor should not be a necessary condition for
caricature, then what accounts for its undeniable close
association with the form? A historical answer is in part
legitimate: caricature has in fact been persistent!~ used t~
humorous ends. But such a reply is incomplete if it does not
confess that caricature lends itself to just such use. The point
is that exaggeration, a prime tool of the caricaturist, is also a
key device of the humorist. This does not mean that all
exaggerated faces are funny, any more than it means that all
exaggerated faces are identifiable. Exaggeration in various
cases may serve a humorous end, an individuating purpose,
both, or neither. That it so often serves both, reflects the
psychology and the individual culture of the human perceiver
and the caricaturist's happy exploitation of both psychology
and culture.

Idealization and Defects

Figure 3

- Fritz Kreisler

These are hardly comic subjects, but the term caricature, if
humor is not a condition, seems an illuminating name for
such pictures.
If one's area of interest is portrait caricatures, the added
condition of exaggeration "to comic effect" would narrow
very little the class of drawings satisfying the requirements;
exaggeration and individuation fix the range of the term
adequately. And a requirement of humor would connect
caricature logically with the snarl of philosophical and
psychological issues surrounding the topic of humor. It seems
prudent to stay as much on the periphery of that as possible.
Furthermore, there is a certain tension between the aim of
humor and the aim of individuation. The political cartoonist
Paul Szep, of the Boston Globe, has emphasized to me the
particular difficulty of producing a caricarture in which the
human face is merged with an animal form. The combination
can be marvelously appropriate, but the amount of differentiating information available is certainly reduced. Worse,
a long nose for an inquisitive but short-nosed person may be

Idealization seems intuitively the very contrary of caricature. Both depart from faithful portraiture, but somehow in
opposite directions. Roughly speaking, idealization means
producing a picture of a subject so as to emphasize various
canons of beauty, masculinity, or whatever, established in
the artist's society. As such, idealization is one form of
exaggeration. This encourages the complementary view that
ugliness is as central to caricature as idealization is counter to
it. Caricature is seen as the exaggeration of the defects of a
physiognomy {Davies 1928; Baldinucci, quoted in Gombrich
1961 :344; Grose, quoted in Lynch 1927:9; Bergson, quoted
in Lynch 1927:5; Random House Dictionary 1968).
But such a formulation reflects a philosophy in which
any departure from an ideal counts as a defect. The usage of
these terms is more tolerant today. Individuality itself carries
certain positive values. There is a large middle ground
between what counts as ideal and what counts as defective.
Exaggeration of individuating features may not produce ideal
types, but need not produce ugliness. Oscar Berger {1952)
presents a number of benign caricatures of various public
figures, done in sittings with their cooperation. In sum,
exaggeration of defects is simply too specialized a requirement to be called a necessary condition for caricature; there
are too many pictures called caricatures that would not be so
described.
Furthermore, ugly caricatures are not really needed to
satisfy our hunch that caricature runs contrary to idealization. Another symmetry besides beauty and ugliness serves as
well. Idealization is a transformation that blurs the distinctiveness of the particular face; a range of individuals all
idealized are depicted as sharing many features that comprise
the ideal standard and hence are less differentiated. Thus
while caricature individuates, idealization disindividuates.

Personality
Many caricaturists often emphasize conveying personalities through their art {Low 1932). In their work, this aim
accompanies or replaces humor. Those that take this approach must gather information about a subject's character;
the personal interview and/or sitting is a favorite device
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION
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(O'Connell 1970; Berger 1952). But Paul Szep has explained
that personal contact is often impossible where major
political figures are concerned. First of all a physiognomic
likeness is the goal. Next, the political cartoonist must
generally work from his target's public character, not his
"home" character- both because that is what is accessible
and that is what the public knows. Finally, the aspects of
character to be emphasized naturally turn on the particular,
and generally critical, function of the cartoon. Thus the
extent to which conveying personality is a primary aim varies
considerably from artist to artist and from circumstance to
circumstance. Personality is not the focus consistently
enough for it to serve as a further necessary condition for
caricature.
Indeed, expression of personality competes considerably
with physiognomic individuation. Topffer and numerous
other artists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
systematically explored variations in cartoon and normal
portraits that yield various personality impressions (Gombrich 1961, ch. 1 0). More recently, psychological research
employing photographs and sometimes composite line faces
reveals that observers will readily - and often consistently
across observers- attribute personality traits to strange faces
(Shoemaker,
South, and
Lowe
1973;
Hochberg
1964:105-110; Secord 1958; Secord and Muthard 1955). But
these personality attributions do not accurately reflect the
true personalities of the photo's subjects; that is, a subject's
face will likely suggest a personality not in keeping with his
actual personality. A caricature or portrait which is both
recognizable without labels or context and also a faithful
expression of the subject's true personality (not the superficial personality projected by his face) must be counted as
an especially fine achievement.
REFERENCE AND DESCRIPTION
If humor, ugliness and expression of personality are
inessential to caricature, then exaggeration and individuation
by themselves must resolve this art form's paradoxes. Two
symbolic functions of special concern are reference - a
caricature is of a person - and description - a caricature
delivers certain shape information about the subject's face.
In order for the caricature to speak about its subject, the
subject must be designated. Sometimes audaciously direct
means are employed: human figures in pictures are simply
labelled with their names, or relatively unambiguous contextual cues are provided - a white house in the background.
Another major means is to provide a picture recognizable
from the face as representing a particular individual. Indeed,
some caricaturists hold it an obligation of their art to eschew
other techniques, especially when a familiar, plausibly
recognizable, public figure is the subject.
Nonabstract pictures, the sorts of concern here, will be
said to describe. This will simply mean that they provide to
the viewer information specifying spatial forms and surface
properties- the shapes, textures, colors of chairs, houses,
faces, or whatever. This quite deliberately ignores the often
important distinctions between pictorial and linguistic means
of symbolizing discussed by Goodman (1968, ch. 4). It
should be mentioned that in general a description, linguistic
or pictorial, need not be a description of any actually
4

existent thing; whether the description is ascribed to a
referent is an independent matter.
That description should be an important function of
caricature appears implausible, considering that a caricature
of a person is manifestly and necessarily inaccurate (if it is an
accurate portrayal we do not normally call it a caricature).
But the problem disappears once one recognizes that a
caricature is two descriptions in one. A caricature can be read
as picturing a face-like spatial form with, for instance, a nose
three inches long, an absurdly weak chin, and so on. On the
other hand, that same caricature can be read as providing
information about the person it stands for, a person
therefore whose nose is long as noses go, though not that
long, a person whose chin is weak as chins go, though not
that weak. In fact two different systems of description are
involved. One specifies a spatial form - but not the form of
the subject- with metric accuracy; the other, relevant to the
form of the subject, need speak only of trends. Exaggeration
necessarily involves just these two levels of description.
The interaction between description and reference is
varied. Sometimes, description may be the means of reference. The descriptive trend information in the drawing is
assimilated by the viewer's face recognition system, which
accomplishes identification of the face. Sometimes, the
descriptive role of a caricature may not begin until reference
is accomplished. If the letter T is displayed with the caption
"Charles Atlas," then clearly the T does not assume its role
of caricaturing Atlas' physique until the reference is
established. And more complex situations abound. For
instance, a drawing prompts recognition, and then descriptive
aspects of the drawing which were not involved in recognition become meaningful in the light of knowledge of the
subject.
The descriptive powers of caricature should not be
considered just narrowly appropriate to pictorial comedy.
For example, a study by Ryan and Schwartz (1956)
compared accurate line drawings, photographs, shaded drawings, and caricature-like "cartoons" as means of picturing
complex spatial layouts, including machinery. The pictures
were exposed tachistoscopically and the caricatures most
successfully conveyed the general organization of the spatial
layouts at shorter exposures.
Furthermore, caricature-like techniques of exaggeration
are actually employed in a number of communications
contexts. Relief maps amplify the vertical scale. Photographers utilize contrast enhancement methods. Examples
occur among pictograms used in international traffic warning
signs, although however clear and emphatic these may appear
to the acculturated viewer, Kolers (1969) warns us to be
wary of any claim that such signs are universally readable.
TRUTH AND REVELATION
A true description is simply a description that specifies
properties true of a referent. Portrait caricature, involving
exaggeration as it does, is never a true description as far as
metric accuracy is concerned. But a caricature may be a true
trend description of its subject. Indeed, if a viewer remarks
that a caricature doesn't look like its subject, he is not likely
to mean that the drawing lies about the subject's exact
metric shape; that is taken for granted. Similarly, if a drawing
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depicts a political figure with a bulldozer body, it would
probably be superfluous to complain that the bulldozer does
not resemble the subject's body. Whether a picture, caricature or not, offers true descriptions must always be judged
relative to an analysis of the multiple kinds of descriptions it
might offer.
The aesthetic functioning of a caricature depends
critically on the viewer's evaluation of its truth and falsity as
description. (A corollary of this is that a caricature cannot be
fully appreciated unless one is familiar with its subject's
physiognomy). Humor in caricature serves as an example. If a
caricature is not taken as a true trend description, then it
becomes simply a funny face, lacking a manifest kernel of
physiognomic truth. But if only the trend description is
noted, there is no perceived overstatement to laugh at.
A viewer's assent to a caricature as a trend description is
not just a piecemeal matter, the nose approved but the
cheeks not, and so on. Judgments of that sort can often be
made, of course, but overall assent may depend as much on
an interplay of features, a gestalt which itself cannot appear
unless all or most of the contributing trends are themselves
correct. Furthermore, a description false in some respects is
brought into question as a whole. Those other propositions it
offers which seem true, seem no more than accidentally true
and lose their merit as commentary. None of this applies to
the falsity of caricature as metric description; this falsity is
recognized as part of the art form, is systematically separable
from the trend description and does not bring it into
question.
When a viewer assents to a caricature's description, his
assent lends credence to ascriptions of the drawing that the
viewer does not have the knowledge to judge. This is entirely
natural; one estimates the overall truth of the message from
those parts of it that one can evaluate. But this phenomenon
allows such misuses of caricature as the Nazi cartoons of
Jews. The caricaturist may couch lies in the very visage itself,
by selectively exaggerating his subject's features so as to
suggest some personality trait such as meanness. If the viewer
knows the subject, but has seen in his face or behavior no
contrary personality indications, the viewer, recognizing the
face, is likely to take the meanness as an aspect of the true
face he had not noticed before, exposed by the art of the
caricaturist. On the other hand, the sophisticated viewer will
have learned to distrust ascriptions of personality in caricature. That is a part of being sophisticated.
In sum, the viewer's assent to, dissent to, or inability to
evaluate a caricature's trend description plays an intimate
role in his whole reaction to the work. In many cases of
humor in caricature, the viewer's judgment of the falsity of
the picture as metric description plays just as important a
role. Further, the viewer's reaction is highly individual,
depending on the prior knowledge and the habits of
categorizing that he brings to his encounter with the picture,
on his familiarity or lack of familiarity with the subject's
face, his preconceptions about the subject's personality, the
degree to which he separates physiognomic, political,
personality, and other ascriptions, and separates metric from
trend descriptions. The viewer's response is as much bound
up in the information he has available and his general habits
of information processing as it is in any exclusively aesthetic

capacities he might have (if exclusively aesthetic capacities
exist at all).
This theme can be carried further yet. The fine caricature
of Beckett as a buzzard, done by Levine and displayed in
Figure 1, exemplifies "relevation." Levine has delivered a
construction that reveals an unexpected visual affinity
between Beckett's physiognomy and that of a buzzard, an
affinity that gains depth because of Beckett's morose literary
works. The example will be discussed further later, but
certainly revelation is not limited to cases of representing a
person as an animal, or as anything else at all. I particularly
recall a caricature of Pushkin by Levine, where the exaggeratedly large and limpid eyes led me suddenly to realize
how those eyes dominated Push kin's face in realistic portrayals. In sum, a caricature reveals when it exposes unnoticed
physiognomic relationships, or the unrealized influence of
particular features on the whole face, or the like.
Accordingly, revelation is a frequent achievement of, but
not a requirement for, caricature. In political cartoons, the
same public figure may recur again and again in the same
style. His reappearances, offering little further physiognomic
revelation, accomplish other functions within the cartoon
such as reference or expression.
'
Some requirements of revelation can be specified in terms
introduced earlier . . First, revelation is part of caricature as a
description; that is, a caricature offers a proposition about a
subject's physiognomy, such as, that it is like a buzzard's in
certain respects. Second, the viewer must affirm the proposition; he does not reserve judgment or accept the proposition
on faith as one might do when viewing a caricature of an
unfamiliar subject. And third, the affirmation is not of an
often entertained and tiresomely familiar proposition, but of
freshly revealed truth. In sum, the caricature entices the
viewer into affirming a novel proposition.
Why is a novel proposition affirmed? Relating the
proposition to accumulated knowledge is required: for
instance, the proposition may complete a pattern of other
propositions; it may neatly sum up a co llection of subordinate propositions, as does the Buzzard-Beckett equation;
it may bring into focus a series of half-realized prior
observations, as with my reaction to Pushkin's eyes. Whatever the relation to prior knowledge, it is a characteristic of
revelation that the very organization of the viewer's perception is changed. Just as, after identifying a camouflaged
figure, it is very difficult to recover one's original naive
perception, so Pushkin and Beckett will never appear as
they did, or not for a long time. In its very rapid, but
long-term, reorganization of the viewer's perceptions, revelation contrasts with more gradual and painful means of
shifting one's perceptions of the world.
Revelation, important throughout the arts, is related to
discovery as the word would be used in science or
philosophy. Both revelation and discovery involve apprehending a new structure or coherence in a body of
accumulated information. Revelation emphasizes some
agent's role in serving up the novel proposition, whereas
discovery emphasizes the creative role of the apprehender in
devising his own coherence. A discovery "comes as a
revelation" just when the creator is largely unconscious of his
own constructive role. Recent research (Muller, Kennedy,
and Tanimoto 1972) has demonstrated that persons prefer
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION
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viewing sequences of pictures where initially distorted,
unrecognizable letters become recognizable over viewing the
reverse sequences, even though they judge the unrecognized
distorted letters as by themselves more interesting than
undistorted but readily identifiable letters. Discovery, that is,
is valued for itself, independently of the value attached to
the content discovered. Each of us can echo this subjectively;
discovery and revelation are rewarding, often exciting experiences. This is one source of affect in caricature and in art
in general.
In considering revelation, there is no need to confine the
viewer to a passive role. If he does not invent the proposition
that the caricaturist lays before him, at least he must read it
out of the caricature, and furthermore he must relate it to his
own knowledge and perceive that the proposition does lend
that knowledge coherence or structure. These operations of
the viewer are themselves active, constructive, and creative.
Every revelation by an agent is to that extent a discovery by
the recipient. Again, a viewer's response to a caricature
emerges as a highly judgmental process very concerned with
fact and logic; his prior information and information
processing habits will determine whether he discovers what
the caricaturist aimed to reveal.

EXAGGERATION AND INDIVIDUATION
In discussing how caricatures are "read," the previous
sections have underscored the central roles of exaggeration
and individuation. In employing exaggeration, caricatures
provide a trend description but not a metric description of
their subjects. And by providing a true trend description,
caricatures individuate.
At once it is clear that exaggeration must not be taken
narrowly, for instance, to mean "making larger., Caricatures
of aggressive chins may be larger, but weak chins are
--.. . . _rendered weaker yet. Some general techniques of exaggeration are: making darker or lighter, larger or smaller,
longer or shorter, and accentuating contours- special cases of
this include rendering hair curlier or the profile more
pronounced. Non-physical traits, as of personality or expression, can also be exaggerated.
In all these cases, exaggeration involves displacement
along a scale measuring (if crudely) some property. More
generally, exaggeration could be defined in terms of a partial
ordering relation on mutually exclusive classifications of
some classification system. If a symbol exaggerates, it refers
to a certain subject, but read according to convention, it also
implies a measurement (classification) of the subject not in
fact cqrrect, but greater than or less than the correct measurement.
But merely distortion is involved if for the same subject
and circumstances "greater than, and "less than, are not
differentiated. Overstating the role of alcohol in accidents is
exaggerating that role, but an understatement does not
exaggerate the role. Neither is what counts as exaggeration a
question of conventional "greater than" scale directions for
various scales; as mentioned above, exaggerated strong chins
are stronger, exaggerated weak chins are weaker. Rather,
exaggeration seems to involve implicit reference to a "normal
point" on a scale; the exaggerated symbol indicates a
6

measurement for a subject which is, starting from the normal
point, beyond the subject's correct measurement. When the
scale has an endpoint (e.g., zero on a length scale), in some
contexts this endpoint serves as the norm and there is only
one direction of exaggeration. In other contexts exaggeration
is relative to interior normal points suggested by population
averages, or by conventions of beauty or health, or the like.
Exaggeration aside, how can scales and normal points
individuate? Common usage provides a clue. We speak of
people as tall or short, fat or thin, and so forth, with implicit
reference to an average height or build. In this way, a scale
like height and a normal point like the average height allow
us to individuate members of a population. Of course, many
scales and norms have no individuating value. In a cartooning
context where all noses get longer, the normal point for
exaggeration is zero nose length. But no one has less than
zero nose length, the scale and norm do not divide the
population, and the cartoons exaggerate without truly
caricaturing. From a standpoint of general informational
efficiency, the population median provides the most individuating norm. But for any number of reasons, other
normal points may be used in sorting: the basketball coach's_
professional standards for "tall" versus "short" will be high.
Caricature involves a triad: the cartoon itself, the subject
caricatured, and scales and individuating norms (often
determined by a standard population) against which the
subject is measured. The caricaturist selects cert'ain of these
~scales and exaggerates along these scales the departure of his
subject from the normal points. Accordingly, the same
subject against a different population might be caricatured
quite differently; Gulliver is a giant among the pygmies and a
pygmy among the giants. Another consequence is the
traditional remark that people with especially ordinary
features are hard to caricature; many of their measurements
fall on the norm points and no proper direction for
exaggeration is defined.
Even for other subjects, the circumstances may not
unambiguously suggest the scales and norms against which an
artist should work; he may have to choose. For example,
suppose an artist aims to caricature a profile which is rather
flat as profiles go (Figure 4, center). Among many alternatives, he might choose to work from the human average, and
render the profile flatter yet (Figure 4, right). Or he might
take a straight line - the average of all wavy lines- as his
origin, and accentuate the contours (Figure 4, left). It seems
plausible that either manipulation, in its own way, might
contribute to a recognizable caricature.
The viewer as well as the artist has problems and options.
In seeing how a caricature is exaggerated, he faces the task of
determining the scales and norms with respect to which
exaggeration was attempted. Does a certain drawing depict a
nose exaggerated in length, an ear-nose distance exaggerated,
a tip-of-nose exaggerated, or what? Such questions are
resolved (with an element of arbitrary choice perhaps) by
cues in the pictures themselves, by knowledge of conventions
of picturing and caricaturing, and through intuitions about
what sorts of scales and norms are psychologically likely. To
say just that much is to touch a complex matter lightly.
Although "reading" a picture as exaggerated is a largely
automatic and unconscious accomplishment, substantial
cognitive activity is clearly involved.
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-Exaggeration relative to different norms

But just that much is enough for the present purpose,
illuminating caricature. The thrust of this section can be
condensed into two definitions. A scale and norm, relative to

a given population, are individuating just when the members
of the population do not all have measurements on the scale
less than, equal to, or greater than the norm. And a symbol
referring to an individual, describing a measurement along a
scale, and relative to a given norm, exaggerates just when the
individual's true measurement on the scale lies between the
described measurement and the norm. Of course, this is an
abstract from the realities of the human condition, where
judgments of degree are uncertain and normal points
indefinite intervals.
DEFINITION
The prior sections lend support to a formal definition. A

symbol referring to an individual and relative to a given scale,
norm, and population is a caricature just when the scale and
norm relative to the population are individuating and the
symbol relative to the individual scale and norm exaggerates.
Of course, a symbol is called a caricature not just because of
one- perhaps coincidental-measurement. Therefore, a

symbol referring to an individual and relative to a whole set
of scales, norms, and populations is a caricature just when it
is a caricature with respect to some of those scales, norms,
and populations and accurate with respect to the others. For
a capsule statement and leaving some terms implicit, a
caricature is a symbol that exaggerates measurements relative t
to individuating norms. This definition is not new; an
essential equivalent was given by Samuel Johnson (Lynch
1927:1 ). Nor is it a radical departure from the trend of prior
proposals. It simply says a little less than some, for instance
in omitting humor, and a little more than others, for instance
in insisting on the central role of exaggeration for individuation's sake.
The definition functions by paring away pretenders to the
name "caricature," to reduce the concept to its most central
core. First of all, the definition requires reference. Certain
sorts of pictures are at once excluded: grotesque faces,
gargoyles, harpies, monsters of various breeds, and so forth.
Referring to no subject, they cannot ascribe properties to
that subject and hence cannot deliver humor, revelation, or
expression of personality in the manner of true caricature.

Of course, realistic pictures and photographs refer to and
describe their subjects. But such pictures are not usually
called caricatures, and the exaggeration requirement excludes
these. Also, exaggeration emphasizes that caricatures occur in
the context of an established system of "more accurate"
representation. Caricature is not simply a trend description,
but a trend description by means of exaggeration, a means
which uses as its instrument the metric descriptive powers of
picturing.
Exaggeration by itself leaves some problems, however.
Portraying a person of average or smaller nose length and ear
size as having a long nose and large ears might prompt a
laugh, but cannot gain the viewer's affirmation of true
description that is so intimately involved in humor in
caricature, as discussed earlier. Such exaggeration does not
provide description differentiating between that particular
subject and any other, information necessary for most of the
other functions of caricature as well as humor. The insistence
that caricature exaggerate with respect to individuating
norms excludes drawings which to not attempt such differentiation.
Just as caricature denies transformations which exaggerate
without individuating, so it denies transformations which
individuate without exaggerating. For instance, an artist may
eliminate details of a face in order to throw the broader
. structural features into prominence. True, the manipulation
packages some individuating properties of the subject for
easy perceptual access. But the means of packaging is
critically different. Many portraits which would never be
called caricatures use such simplification, and though caricaturists often simplify as well as exaggerating, everythinga
caricaturist does need not be strictly caricature.
Finally, the relation between caricature as an abstraction
and caricature in a human context must be explored. In light
of the formal definition, the casual question "Is such-andsuch symbol a caricature?" is badly formed, incomplete
unless symbol systems, scales, norms, and so forth are
specified. Most any symbol will be a caricature with respect
to some trumped up specifications. But informally asking
whether a symbol is a caricature makes implicit reference to
our system of pictorial representation, the populations out of
which subjects must be differentiated, and the scales and
norms we routinely employ in perceiving and making
judgments about pictures or real world scenes.
Certainly to be avoided is an oversimple conception of
seeing a picture as a caricature, where a visual system
methodically and exhaustively checks through some list of
norms and scales to see whether the picture fits the
definition. A prime concern of the viewer is to make sense of
the picture, to determine its referent, and the relation
between referent and subject. If the viewer can discover
several scales and norms with respect to which the picture is
a caricature, and notices few other scales and norms where
the picture seems merely distorted (though there are almost
bound to be many} then he will construe the picture as
caricature. Therefore, whatever scales, norms and so forth a
psychologist might list as "usually attended to," some
pictures would formally be caricatures with respect to this
list without always being recognized as such, some pictures
would not formally be caricatures without the discrepancies
always being noticed, and some pictures would be caricatures
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION

7

with respect to scales not on the list, but brought to the
attention of the viewer by the caricaturist's skill.

ANIMAL CARICATURES AND CARTOONS
The definition of caricature, abstracted from several
crucial examples, should now prove its ability to analyze
cases not figuring in its conception. Previously, various sorts
of pictures were placed relative to caricature: portraits refer,
describe their referents, but do not exaggerate; grotesques
may exaggerate norms of ugliness but do not refer to or
exaggerate an individual; and so on. Now the definition may
be tried on a fresh domain, the cluster of problems
surrounding the use of animal-like figures in caricatures and
cartoons. Levine's buzzard caricature of Beckett has already
been introduced, but the logical status of such a mix of
human and animal characteristics was not discussed and
remains puzzling.
Drawings wherein a recognizable subject is presented
wearing the clothes-as it were-of an animal, are often
especially engaging. Such drawings are generally called
caricatures, but whether or not they merit the name in the
technical sense proposed here is a subtle issue. A further
example
appears
in
Figure 5 from
Gombrich
(1963: 213-214), who comments on its economy. Establishing reference with such a drawing depends on (1) a few
effective clues- the cigarette holder, the smile, the tilt of the
chin, (2) a context of current events and conventional
symbols-the donkey, and (3) absence of counterevidence.
The interplay between (1) and (3) is worth stressing.
Recognition can take place with very few clues so long as
features in the picture serving solely humor or other purposes
(e.g., the ears of the donkey) are not taken to be attributes
of the subject's real face.
Cartoons of this sort have at their heart a pun-like double
reference, both to Beckett and buzzard, to Roosevelt and
donkey, and so forth. In Goodman's terms (1968:27-41),
Figure 1 denotes Beckett but is also a buzzard picture, and
pictures may represent individuals not only as animals, but as

buildings, volcanos, machinery, and so on. But how does
such double-reference relate to caricature, construed as the
exaggeration of measures relative to individuating norms?
Clearly "double reference" and "exaggeration of measures ... " are logically different formulas, inviting a search
for instances of one without the other. Furthermore, there is
nothing in the "double reference" notion about a natural
resemblance between the two entities referred to. Figure 5 is
an apt example. For the second point, the characteristics of
the picture that identify Roosevelt are not those that
identify donkeys. The Roosevelt features are grafted on, so
to speak, and the drawing turns on no particular natural
resemblance between donkeys and Roosevelt. Returning to
the first point, the Roosevelt features themselves are little
exaggerated, at least as compared to the accompanying
photograph. There is the lengthened cigarette holder, but on
the whole the picture is not much "caricatured" in our sense.
Levine's Beckett-as-Buzzard (Figure 1) is a contrasting
case. Here several characteristics of the drawing perform
double duty, describing both buzzards and Beckett. The
beak-nose, the neck and chin, the facial wrinkles, and even
the collar, are examples. Further, the portraying of the
buzzard, accomplishing the animal reference, goes hand in
hand with exaggeration of individuating trends of Beckett's
face. Finally, implicit in the choice of buzzard is the
exaggeration of personality characteristics of Beckett as
reflected in his work.
In qualification, it is worth noting that the ears, so
emphasized in the caricature of Beckett on the right of
Figure 1, are reduced in the buzzard-Beckett so as to avoid
an absurdly large-eared buzzard; the buzzard's ears seem even
smaller than Beckett's true ears. Further, the buzzard version
is certainly less recognizable all in all than the other, and
functions particularly well when placed beside it. As always,
there is this tension between manipulations for the sake of
humor or personality comment and manipulations for the
sake of individuation. As remarked earlier, many drawings
caricaturing several measurements would merely distort
others. But in the balance, the Beckett-buzzard caricatures a

Figure 5
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number of scales we are likely to attend to, while missing on
but a few. Applying the definition with the recommended
tolerance, the cartoon is a caricature.
The fact remains that established practice would label the
Roosevelt-donkey a caricature. This simply says that we have
two alternative standards for caricature: individuating exaggeration and double reference. This paper restricts the term
"caricature" to the first standard as the more commonly
applicable one. But that is ultimately a matter of philosophical strategy and choice. However the word is used, the
puzzling case of animal caricatures is resolved by recognizing
that history has established two alternative standards rather
than one.
Animal cartoon characters fail both standards; usually
they do not involve double reference, nor are they usually
caricatures in the present sense. A drawing of Donald Duck is
no.t intended to be identified as anybody but Donald Duck (a
fictional construct created by a series of such pictures) and is
certainly an accurate, not an exaggerated, portrayal of him.
True, Donald and many other cartoon characters exhibit a
mixture of various animal and human features, often
distorted - web feet and too-wide bill, the frontally located
eyes, and arms with four-fingered hands. The result of course
is a creature that is neither much of a duck or much of a
human, as Mad cartoonist Bill Elder points out in Figure 6.
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Figure 6

be pictorial. A mimic may offer an overblown version of his
subject's voice and gestures; a writer may satirize another's
work by exaggerating his idiosyncracies of style. Such efforts
can certainly be called caricatures. And the usage does not
reveal limitations in the present definition, because that
definition nowhere requires pictorial symbols. The generalization is already there.
Caricatures of fictive individuals-Clark Kent, for instance-also occur. A generalization to accommodate this
case comes fairly easily. If pictures of Clark Kent denote
nothing, at least they are still descriptions of threedimensional shapes which collectively and pretty consistently
establish what the Clark Kent face shape is. Accordingly, that
shape can be caricatured much as any other face shape. Such
a caricature, of course, can't be said to denote Clark Kent
any more than a "realistic" picture of Clark Kent does. But
both can be treated as fictive representations, for instance, in
the manner discussed by Goodman (1968:21-26).
However, some fictive individuals-Donald Duck, perhaps-may be quite difficult to caricature in any strict sense.
With Clark Kent, the usual norms of human appearance may
be invoked. But what norms apply to Donald Duck, when he
is one of a kind? Certainly one can make distorted pictures
of Donald Duck, but the distinction between individuating
exaggeration and mere distortion tends to collapse.
This leaves the present formulation constrained to caricatures of individuals, real or fictive. But caricatures of classes
are commonplace. The Nazi caricatures of Jews from
Gombrich (1963) have already been mentioned. Today blue
collar workers, hippies, intellectuals, and dozens of other
groups are routinely lampooned by the caricaturist's art.
Figure 7 offers a contemporary example. Ideals like
''beauty" or concepts like "cold war" can also be caricatured. Unfortunately, the easy substitution of "class" for
"individual" in the present definition does not yield an
adequate generalization. Caricatures of classes simply involve
more complex symbolic relationships, and require a more
general construal of the concepts exaggeration and individuation.

-Donald and other ducks

But Donald in shape is no effort to caricature either a duck
or a human, though his actions may caricature human
foibles. The distortions and mixing of human and animal
features must be attributed to different aims. One of these is
clearly the anthropomorphizing of the animal form, so that it
will appear less alien (the frontal eyes are important here!},
can manipulate objects with hands, and so on.
CONCLUSIONS
The context so far has been the pictorial caricaturing of
individual physiognomies. But the term caricature has a
wider application than that. First of all, a caricature need not

" ... SON ... I"

Figure 7
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These concepts, as well as those of describing, revealing,
truth judgments, and so on discussed earlier, have been the
instruments for drawing a fairly sharp line around the notion
of caricature of individuals. Certainly that line's placement
has been guided by a personal intuition, but not an arbitrary
one. The aim has been to systematically respect evident gulfs
between the T which is not a description and the hulking T
labelled Charles Atlas; between grotesques depicting no
subject and equally monstrous images lampooning a victim;
between the mere lie of the child's monster picture labelled
"teacher" and the truth-in-lie of caricature; between draw!ngs that in simplifying characterize and drawings that in
exaggerating caricature; between pictures merely half-animal,
half-man-the Roosevelt-donkey- and pictures with parts
simultaneously animal and man-the Beckett-buzzard. The
logic of the analysis hopefully does not blur or ignore, but
rather delineates and explains, caricature as a unique art
form.

PART II
CARICATURE AND RECOGNITION
With all their distortions, we recognize caricatures. The
puzzle is how. But perhaps the emphasis on caricature as the
thing to be accounted for is wrong. Caricature recognition
need not be explained as some adaptation, adjustment or
success-in-the-face-of-adversity of the normal recognition
process. One can turn the issue upside down and suggest that
caricature recognition is a full manifestation of the normal
recognition process, which is itself to be explained. And
caricatures provide a means of investigation. The caricaturist
is a natural experimenter, exploring distortions for the sake
of satire, expression of personality, and so forth, while also
meeting the need to deliver an identifiable image. In
diverging from accuracy but preserving identity, his works
provide a measure of which facial properties are important
to identification.
The aim here is to explore these physiognomic invariants,
these constancies between caricature and subject and
between one caricature and another of the same subject. The
approach is analogous to that of J. J. Gibson ( 1950, 1966)
who bases his analysis of visual processes on invariants in the
optic array. But the sources of perturbation across which
constancies are sought are not only the shifting perspectives
of the viewer and changing illumination. The transformations are provided by the caricaturist, and the search for
constancies encouraged by his need to supply an identifiable
work in spite of these transformations, or even by means of
them.
E. J. Gibson's work (1969:102-105) provides a framework
for restating the subject in another way. She, like myself,
feels that the recognition of caricatures can be explained vi a
the normal face recognition process. Caricaturists exaggerate
"distinctive features" of the human face , those features by
means of which viewers discriminate face from face and
identify individuals. Choosing its own terminology, this
paper will speak of individuating "properties" or "attributes"
of the face, taking the terms in the broadest sense and as
synonymous.
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Like sonnet or sonata, this approach is a form needing
explicit content to be meaningful. Of necessity, recognition
depends on individuating properties of the stimulus. On what
else could it depend? The essential questions are which and
what sorts of attributes contribute to identification. Many
alternative sets of properties may be logically adequate bases
for discrimination over a given range of stimulus materials.
Which properties are psychologically relevant must be determined. These could vary from culture to culture, or even
from perceiver to perceiver. But the very phenomenon of
caricature recognition suggests that at least within a culture,
constancies prevail and await discovery.
Any such quest must acknowledge that a caricature
incorporates many devices irrelevant to recognition . Certain
features of caricatures are better accounted for as purely
comic devices, as conventions of cartooning, as means of
expressing personality, or in like ways. Furthermore, some
apt caricatures require the assistance of labels and other cues,
because the subject is not well known or because the
caricature abstracts too far from the subject's appearanceconsider a large capital T labelled "Charles Atlas." If
recognition from the image itself plays an important role in
caricature, there is no pretense that it is the only role. But
that role is the focus of this study.
A search for individuating attributes also demands respect
for the alternative hypothesis, that caricature recognition
occurs in spite of, and not because of, the selective
transformations wrought by the caricaturist. Perhaps a viewer
must become familiar with the distortions caricaturists
generally employ, so that he may discount this false
evidence. Perhaps the viewer must learn that certain information is generally absent, in order not to be confused by that
absence. Perhaps he must learn that caricatures often tell lies
in ways not involving exaggeration, such as displaying the
wrong number of wrinkles on a forehead. In short, possibly a
successful reading of caricatures depends on a sophisticated
familiarity with the genre .
The argument will be that this is not true to any great
extent. The circumstantial evidence points strongly to this
conclusion. However, the gleeful exploration of the caricaturist is not the methodical manipulation of the scientist.
Neither is the response of his audience carefully surveyed and
qu antified. Perfectly rigorous findings must emerge from
more engineered circumstances, in which both the drawings
presented and the responses of viewers are subject to
systematic control and analysis. The present paper will
perhaps point directions into such research, and anticipate
some of its conclusions.
AN EXAMPLE

As leader of the United States government, the President
seems always to acquire the uncomfortable status of "most
caricatured person." When this work began in 1970, cartoons
representing President Richard Nixon proved far more
available than those of anyone else, and a large collection of
these provided the basis for the study. Later on, some
tentative generalizations will be made from consideration of
this one case ; the reader may judge their plausibility for
himself. But one point deserves emphasis: this study concerns recognition of very well known faces and hence
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concerns highly practiced acts of identification. Results will
require at least minor adjustments if applied to recognition
of less familiar or just learned faces. The caricaturist is well
aware of this difference. Paul Szep, political cartoonist for
the Boston Globe, has remarked to me that he can exercise
much more freedom in his treatment of a very well known
face. Less prominent public figures allow less latitude and
require more care if the caricaturist's effort is to prompt
recognition.
Mapping the relationships between caricature recognition
and the recognition of normal faces requires first of all
answers to two questions: which attributes of caricatu res of
the President distinguish them from caricatures of other
individuals, and do those attributes represent exaggerated
properties of the President's true face? The treatment of the
nose is pa rticularly interesting here. Figures 8(a-l) are in most
respects typical. First of all, the nose is long, but also quite
narrow. Such a shape is remarkably uncommon in caricature
in general, the usual "big nose" being much broader at the
base, large but not as thin. But the properties of thinness and
elongation are common to almost all caricature presentations
of President Nixon's nose. There is a further attribute,
common again to nearly all caricatures of the President, but
also not infrequent in caricature in general: the nose slopes
downward from the root.
The swelling toward the tip of this example and the
upward curl of the bridge are properties not as persistent as
the above, but nevertheless common devices occurring in
somewhat better than half of the cartoons examined. A final
feature frequent in caricatures of the President is the vertical
seam in the tip of the nose.
These observations argue that the treatment of the nose
does not merely invoke general conventions like an eye
represented by a dotted circle. Rather, several properties of
the nose are relatively specific to caricatures of the President.
The next section will pursue how important these properties
are to recognition. Here, the question remains whether the
attributes are simply conventions specific to the President, or
whether the caricatures reflect features of the real face. If
they do, this supports the interpretation that caricature
recognition borrows the normal recognition process.
Figures 9a through 9f present profile, three-quarter, and
full-face photographs of the President. The representationin-caricature of the nose as long and narrow seems amply
justified by the profile and three-quarter views. These
properties are not as evident in the full face photographs,
which instead display the rather broad structure of the nose.
More on this later. Most views show that the bottom edge of
the nose slopes markedly down toward the lip, a feature
common to most of the caricatures investigated. The
occasional vertical seam in the tips of caricature noses is
evident in Figures 9d, though few of the photos examined
were sharp enough to contain this detail. An upward curl is
also apparent in the photographs. The bridge of the nose near
the eyes is distinctly more vertical than near the tip.
Examination of photographs of other men reveals that this is
not generally so.
However, the bulb end is dubious as a caricatured feature
of the real face. Photographs 9a and 9d offer no signs of such
a physiognomic structure. Photographs 9b and 9c might be
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Figure 8a

-by Haynie

Figure 8b

- by Szep

- by Feiffer

Figure 8d

- by Feiffer
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thought to do so. But this is an illusion, a consequence of the
dark nostril denting the profile of the nose. Just the same
effect is apparent in photographs of other men with varying
types of noses. Whether the bulb end contributes at all to
recognition still remains somewhat uncertain. The bulb might
express some property other than shape- a fleshy quality for
example. But of course, there is no need to account for
everything in terms of recognition. Comedy is reason enough
in caricature. Such features as the seam, the elongation, the
downward slope, the curl, are on the face of it aspects

Figure Be

- by Oliphant

common to caricature and man. If this is not so of the bulb,
or at least not obviously so, then the feature can readily be
ascribed to objectives other than recognizability .
Full face caricatures of President Nixon pose an interesting problem for cartoonists. Above, it was remarked
that the long nose, a nearly universal feature of the
caricatures, was not apparent in the full face photographs.
Logically it should not occur in full face caricatures. The
natural expectation is that the cartoonist would caricature a
view as seen, indicating the wide nose with the tip dipping
well below the sides, but sacrificing indication of length. But
only one cartoonist to my present knowledge has taken this
course, Jules Feiffer (Figure 8c}.
What is the alternative? An obvious ploy is for the
caricaturist to avoid the full face view, and indeed the full
face view proves quite uncommon. But there are other
means. Figure 8g displays a caricature that is unquestionably
full face except in one respect. The artist, Mort Drucker, has
cocked the nose slightly to the right in order to portray its
length. Challenging the geometry of the viewpoint, he insists
on displaying an attribute he thinks to be important for his
caricature.
Feiffer does much the same in reverse. Just as Drucker
brings his particular conception of the nose, suggested by
three-quarter or profile views, to full face caricature views, so
does Feiffer employ his wide nose style in three-quarter
caricature views as well as full face. Figure 8d is an example.
Thus each artist emphasizes different properties of the nose,
and extends this emphasis to viewpoints where, in a
photograph, these properties would not be as apparent.

Figure 8f

Figure 8g
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Figure 8h

- by Hungerford

Figure 8k

Figure 81

Figure 8i

Figure 8j

-by Lurie

-by Drucker

-by Szep

- by Herb/ock

The hairline and hair also appear to contribute to
recognition. The photographs present the contour of the
hairline clearly. A very distinctive lock runs back along the
center of the forehead, a lock surrounded on either side by
bays. Viewing photos of other men of similar age reveals that
such a hairline contour in this pronounced degree is quite
unusual. Almost all cartoonists drawing the President have
capitalized on the uniqueness of the hairline by rendering it
in their cartoons. A deepening and rounding out of the bays
is the most prevalent means of exaggeration. Almost all
caricaturists do this. Slightly narrowing the center lock is
another common device. Fairly often cartoonists will also
represent waves in the hair, glossiness, and highlights (Figure
8a). Indeed properties of the real hair as photographs 9c and
9d illustrate, often are not indicated at all.
Well worth stressing is that the hairline with the nose, or
even by itself, seems remarkably distinctive of the President.
Caricaturist Haynie offers us in Figure 1Oa President Nixon
clearly recognizable from just the nose up. Concealing either
the hair or the nose with a finger gives some idea of the
relative importance of the two features, suggesting that the
hair, for a single feature, provides the viewer with a
considerable amount of distinguishing information.
The modest jowls evident in the photographs are treated
by virtually all caricaturists. The jowls, like the nose, are
subject not only to accentuation for recognition's sake, but
for humor's sake as well. In the popular three-quarter view,
the jowls are rendered by indicating the bulge in the profile
of the cheek, and, near the mouth, by proper manipulation
of the facial creases from the nose to the tip of the mouth
and from the tip of the mouth down toward the chin.
Sometimes one of these creases is omitted, or the two are
combined into one. Essentially the same technique serves in
full face views (Figure 8g). The degree of exaggeration varies
from the relatively benign Figure 8a, to the utterly grotesque, as in Figures 8e or 8f.
Earlier the awkwardness of portraying the elongate nose
in full face caricatures was discussed. Problems of full face
versus three-quarter versus profile views arise again with the
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION
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Figures 9a-f
- Photographs of
President Richard Nixon

a

b

e

c

cheeks. In photographs, neither the full face nor the profile
view displays the jowls distinctly. In full face, this situation
has dismayed caricaturists not at all. They proceed to employ
their normal techniques for the cheeks as mentioned above,
ignoring the fact that the jowls are less visible in full face.
The profile photographs, however, suggest difficulties; in
these the jowls though visible are apparent largely through
shading, a device not so much in the cartoonist's repertoire as
is pure line. Near omission (Figure 8j) or extreme exaggeration so that the cheek profile shows (Figure 8k), are two
resolutions. Caricaturist Herblock offers a third of particular
interest. The lacing of wrinkles apparent in Figure 81 serves
to indicate the jowls even in a profile view. These wrinkles
are not at all evident features of the real face. In a few of the
photographs examined, there was the hint of a single crease
dropping from the eye along the side of the cheek. Even in
those cases, there was only one. The truth-in -1ie nature of
caricature was never so bald. These creases, lying as they do
about themselves as specific features, nevertheless succeed in
conveying the slump of the cheek.
14

d

f

However, the general trend is that caricaturists employ a
three-quarter view, ::1nd part of the reason surely is that the
nose is difficult in full face and the cheeks awkward in
profile. Of some 38 caricatures of the President examined for
this work, only five were full face or nearly full face, and
only six were profile views. Paul Szep has told me that in
general a three-quarter likeness is usually easier than one in
profile or full face. Rother (1966), in a "how-to-do-it" article
promotes the three-quarter view. Berger says that the profile
comes easiest- a. minority opinion (Berger 1952). At least in
examples presented here, advantages of the three-quarter
view relate to particular difficulties in representing specific
properties of the face.
A further attribute common to almost all caricatures of
President Nixon is a "box chin." Figure 8g exemplifies,
portraying the tip of the chin as protruding below the basic
line of the jaw. The effect is often quite pronounced in the
caricatures, so that as in this example, the borders of the box
chin become vertical before touching the jawline. A look at
the photographs supports the box chin as a property of the
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and perhaps more so than the box chin. Thus there are
various potentially distinguishing features of the President's
physiognomy that are just as often omitted as used by
caricaturists.

THE QUESTION OF NECESSITY

Figure 70

-A partial view

true face. The tip of the chin in the photographic profiles
clearly depends below the jawline. In the three-quarter and
full-face views, the seams dropping from either side of the
mouth, and a slight shift in the angle of the jawline, serve to
set off an area in the front of the jaw.
Several attributes of Nixon's face in caricature and
in fact have been considered in some detail. Several others
deserve brief mention. Prominent in the former President, as
in many others, are the creases running from the sides of the
nose to the sides of the lips. Caricaturists generally represent
these, and use them to emphasize the cheeks as remarked
earlier. A less common pair of creases can be observed in the
photograph of Figure 9d falling from the sides of the lips
toward the chin. Caricaturists often, but not always, offer
these lines as well. Occasionally these two lines are combined
into one- Figure 8f.
The horizontal crease, or near-crease, falling between
Nixon's lower lip and chin is often depicted in caricature;
this again is a feature common to many human faces. The
cartoonists further generally supply crow's feet and furrows
in the forehead. These are rarely apparent in photographs,
but are real enough and can be seen in the particularly sharp
photograph of Figure 9d. There seems little effort to
replicate the exact patterns of these creases.
Further features near the eyes are of interest. The
eyebrows are dark, and have a distinctive shape, rising from
the middle toward the sides, peaking and then hooking down
again. A number of caricaturists represent this contour (see,
for example, Figure 8g). But better than half do not, even
though it would seem a plausible contribution to recognition-indeed, Rother (1966) claims that the eyebrows are
often an especially effective point of identification. Almost
all photographs reveal distinct bags under the eyes. Some
caricaturists represent these, but just as often not. Again this
is somewhat surprising, since this feature like the eyebrows
seems a priori fully as evident and characteristic as the nose

The four attributes, elongate nose, jowls, contoured
hairline, and box chin, occur persistently in caricatures of
President Nixon and not in caricatures of others. The
features reflect real properties of his face. These observations
suggest that the attributes make a genuine contribution to
recognition. But a more careful test is in order. In logical
terms, to what extent are these attributes necessary for a
portrait caricature to be recognized as the former President,
and to what extent are they sufficient for a portrait
cariacture to be so recognized? The first half of this question
is the concern just now.
An interesting observation, but not an answer to the
question, is that among the professional caricatures examined, having most of the four properties mentioned above
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a portrait
caricature to be an effort (however successful) at caricaturing
President Nixon. This is simply a rephrasing of the fact that
all the samples of Nixon caricatures do have most of these
properties and no samples of non-Nixon caricatures have
most of them. But fundamentally this is a statement about
the behavior of the artists. In spite of their habits, perhaps
fewer of these attributes would do.
Then what is the effect of eliminating one or all of the
four "key" properties from various "good" caricatures of the
President? Figure 11 is a sample. There, 11 a represents a
tracing of the original caricature (Figure 8a). Figure 11 b
copies the original except that is has been redrawn to alter all
four attributes. Further 11 c, d, e, and f copy the original
except that, respectively, jowls, hairline, box chin, and
elongate nose have been redrawn. Clearly the modifying of
all four in 11b utterly destroys its recognizability. For a
single attribute, absence of jowls in 4c perhaps most degrades
the resemblance, and the hairline in 4d the least impairs it. In
all cases, there is a marked detriment. Similar manipulations
of other caricatures bear out these observations.
Simple absence of one or more. of these four properties is
not the degrading factor. Recall the success of Figure 10. It is
not the invisibility of the key properties, but their replacement by counter-properties that degrades the resemblance by
providing inappropriate clues. But some other properties
logically just as distinctive (e.g., the eyebrows) may be
completely misrepresented with little if any effect on
identification.
What is the conclusion about the necessity of these four
properties? One might say casually that they - and perhaps
others- are "rather necessary" or "mostly necessary . " The
equivocation is essential. A cartoon may indicate an attribute, contra-indicate it (i.e., indicate something incompatible with it) or give no information about it. If each of the
four features is necessary in any ser,se, the sense is not that
each must necessarily be present. Rather, no feature must be
contra-indicated.
Of course, even this is too strong. Contra-indication of
one or two attributes may leave a substantial resemblance
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION
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- Caricature 8a with modified features
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and permit recognition. The mechanisms of recognition
operate with a certain tolerance for and awareness of
contra-indication. The four attributes are "rather necessary"
in the sense that contra-indication of any one of them
degrades resemblance (and presumably recognition) much
more than simple absence, and contra-indication of many of
them destroys resemblance and recognition.
The tracings that yielded conclusions about "rather
necessary" conditions also point to a definitely unnecessary
condition: the exact shape of the caricature. The tracing
process inevitably introduces minor metric deviations from
the proportions of the original caricature. But the traced
caricature remains recognizable, as Figure 11 a illustrates. Yet
such minor distortion can be significant; the effect on
photographs is quite different. Figure 12 displays tracings of

f

photographs 9c and 9d. The resemblance to the President is
slight indeed. Two more considerations complete the point:
tracings of large photographs are readily recognizable, and
even a freehand copy of a caricature is generally quite
recognizable. Then as far as recognition is concerned, the
caricature is much less sensitive to minor random metric
distortion than the true photograph or presumably the true
face. Exact metric proportion is not a critical aspect of a
caricature.
This finding should not be surprising. Exaggeration is the
central technical device of caricature. The caricaturist pushes
the distinguishing trends of a subject's proportions toward
extremes. If recognition depends on or is enhanced by these
overstated trends, then minor metric variations should not
alter the overstatement nor therefore reduce recognition.

Figure 72
- Tracings of Figures 9c and 9d
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THE QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY
The exploration of necessary conditions leaves unsettled
the matter of sufficient conditions. Are the four attributes
stressed above sufficient for a caricature to be recognizable as
the President? The point of course would be to list attributes
at once necessary and sufficient. For sufficiency alone, all
one need do is select a recognizable carica ture and to
announce that duplicates of this are sufficient. This tells us
nothing. Strictly speaking, the bid for both necessity and
sufficiency is already lost, since the attributes under discussion are only "rather necessary" in t he e la bo rate se nse
discussed earlier. However, perh aps at least there is a concept
of "rather sufficient" to match.
But the game really is lost. Neither the four key
properties, no r these together with various ancillary features
mentioned ea rlier, are sufficient or even approach sufficiency. A convincing demonstration of this is an effort to
caricature according to the recipe of these properties. Failure
is remarkably easy. In the course of this study, I have learned
to make recognizable caricatures of Nixon with fair reliability (Figure 13) but also have learned how easy it is to
miss. Figure 14 exhibits a deliberate miss. The evidence is
there: jowls, hairline, nose, box chin, and more. But the
visage remains unrecognizable. In this case, reasons are not at
all elusive. The line of the profile is too concave and the
entire head too squat. Thus there are properties "rather
necessary" to a caricature of the President not among those
already discussed.
Such failures are not the exclusive province of the
amateur. There are a number of quite inadequate professional attempts. This emerged in a striking way after much of the
analysis reported here had been completed. Searches through
periodicals uncovered caricatures which formerly would not
have been collected. A deliberate check of their features
revealed that they were efforts at caricaturing the President,
efforts which had formerly prompted no recognition. A

careful look at the context (captions, White House in the
background, etc.) confirmed these judgments. This remarkable circumstance demonstrates once again that the four
attributes fall well short of sufficiency. On the positive side,
it stresses again how persistent these attributes are, occurring
as they do in both successful and unsuccessful professional
efforts.
Why do these properties fall so far short of sufficiency,
and what chances are there for improvement? An examination of less effective caricatures reveals on the one hand
definite directions for refinement, and on the other some
extreme difficulties. First, the descriptive predicates used are
after all rather vague; they allow too much room for
variation. For example, jowls which descend too far but
bulge · little seem to detract. One course therefore is to
narrow definitions of the present properties. Second, there
are further "rather necessary" conditions inviting specification, as illustrated above. Some caricatures suffer from a
head too squat, or a profile too concave or convex. In
general, it is often easy to point to a particular aspect of an
inadequate caricature and suggest a specific improvement. A
tracing of the caricature, with the aspect then appropriately
modified, is more effective. But just as often the failing is an
enigma. No approaches for improvement occur, or those that
do are ineffective when tried.
A more subtle barrier to refining this approach is that the
shape predicates used here are framed in words. Words are
singularly inadequate for conveying shape information. One
would prefer some sort of notation for shape, a notation in
terms of which such conditions as "long nose" or "jowls"
could be defined in a narrower and more precise sense. But
Goodman (1968) gives reason to doubt that such a notation
is possible. His analysis stresses that the infinitesimal variation possible in pictures is incompatible with certain formal
requirements for a notation. Perhaps for this purpose,
something short of a notation in his sense would do.
Certainly, a truly elegant theory of caricature recognition (or

)

')
Figure 73

- Caricatures by the author
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Figure 75a

Figure 74

-by Zsep

-A deliberate miss

of recognition in general) would seem to require some
language more appropriate than English.
Although the properties discussed offer no certain
formula for recognizable caricatures, most professional caricaturists are persistently successful in their renderings of the
President. Each artist has developed his own recipe, his own
"sufficient" but not "necessary" approach to caricaturing
the President. There is a great variation from artist to artist,
but the cartoons by the same artist are very much alike;
Figure 15 illustrates. It is not difficult to learn to draw
caricatures of the President in the manner of the various
artists discussed here. Much harder, even with the help of a
list of important properties, is to invent a suitable technique
of one's own.
In the light of these remarks, the relevance of the four
properties to learning to caricature might be questioned. But
recall that these properties were found to be ''rather
necessary"; omitting them assures failure. Neither do beginners usually include them from the first. In a casual
experiment, about ten college students were invited to
caricature the President from photographs 9c and 9d . They
then heard a lecture and saw illustrations explaining many of
the points presented here. Finally, they were again called
upon to try a caricature, and were urged to use the several
properties that had been stressed in the course of the lecture.
The result was not, of course, a set of perfect caricatures. But
in almost every case the student included in the second
important properties he had formerly omitted. Almost all
initial efforts were quite unrecognizable, but in several cases
the second attempt began to bear distinct resemblance to the
President. Figures 16 (before and after) offer an example.

Figure 75b

Figure 75c

-by Zsep

Figure 75d

A MODEL OF RECOGNITION
The study of caricatures of the President suggests a
number of generalizations. The recognition of a caricature as
representing a particular subject appears to depend in large
part upon a few ' ' key" properties of the subject's physiognomy, properties presented in exaggerated form in the
caricature. Recognition as that subject is blocked if a few of
these key properties a re contra-indicated. Some properties
weigh more heavily than others in this respect. If not so
18

Figure 75e

STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION

- by Zsep

- by Oliphant

- by Oliphant

~~,l
(~
}

Figure 76
-Caricatures by a student, before (left) and
after (right) a lecture on caricatures of the President

blocked, recognition can often take place in spite of the
pictured spatial form's divergence from the shape of the
subject's face, in spite of the omission of numerous details, in
spite of the inclusion of false detail, in spite of concealment
of several key properties (as opposed to contra-indication of
themL and in spite of the inclusion of properties inconsistent
with the viewpoint.
These considerations are reminiscent of identifying an
item through a logical conjunction of conditions. Several
positive findings may suffice to discriminate that item from
other items. But one negative finding suffices to disprove
that identification. The same logic appears to underlie the
caricature recognition process, a process however which is
cautious enough of circumstantial evidence or counterevidence not to reject an hypothesis on the basis of just one
negative finding.

This leaves two questions: whether the same general
model of pattern recognition applies to face, as well
as to caricature, identification; and further whether the
properties caricature and face recognition depend upon
are the same. Most broadly, face recognition like caricature recognition can be viewed as a process of checking
for certain "key" attributes. To put flesh on that skeleton
requires saying something about what kind of attributes. The
situation with caricature suggests that in normal face
recognition also: (1) precise metric information and fine
detail about the face is irrelevant; (2) the key attributes are
relatively few; (3) the disposition of non-key attributes,
whether presented, concealed, or contra-indicated, is irrelevant to recognition; (4) recognition may take place on
the basis of very partial evidence; (5) recognition will be
blocked by contra-indication of key attributes.

Figure 7 7
-The effect of blurring on
recognition; pictures blurred as on the
right were recognized 85% of the time
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Metric Precision and Fine Detail

Irrelevant Attributes

Recent experiments of Harmon {1973) establish clearly
that metric precision and fine detail are unnecessary for face
recognition. Harmon tested subjects' recognition of images of
faces treated in ways that destroyed fine detail and exact
contour to varying degrees. He found that recognition could
survive substantial mistreatment of the image, as in Figure
17 for instance.
Superficially, this finding appears contrary to the discovery mentioned earlier that tracings of small photographs
of the President did not yield good resemblances. The
resolution lies in recognizing two points. First of all, the
amount of blurring a given face can stand and still remain
recognizable will certainly vary with the particular attributes
that are distinctive of that face, as Harmon has noted. But
second and more important, this paper argues that recognition of real faces, like caricatures, depends on the trend,
rather than the exact measure, of features- whether noses are
long or short as noses go, chins are weak or strong as chins
go. On this interpretation, for face and caricature recognition
alike, accuracy per se would have no value; but inaccuracy to
the degree of changing trends would block recognition.
Indeed the traced features of the President in Figure 12 do
not deliver particularly well three of the four properties
isolated: jowls, box chin, and elongated nose.

This category asks whether in recognition of true faces as
in caricature recognition, large numbers of non-key attributes
are simply irrelevant to recognition, which will succeed
whether those attributes are represented or misrepresented. I
know of no literature addressing this issue. If one accepts the
thesis that caricature recognition simply borrows the normal
face recognition process, caricature itself is the best example
of this happening.

Few Key Attributes
This issue presupposes that recogn1t1on depends on
various measures, accurate or crude, of the face, measures
such as nose length, nose angle, eye placement, eyebrow
thickness. Obviously one could list an enormous number of
dimensions which varied across individuals and logically
could be used to differentiate them. But the analysis of
caricatures suggests that, there at least, relatively few dimensions suffice. The four attributes identified earlier might
break down into ten or so dimensions- the nose might
involve length, thickness, and upward curl, for instance.
Although the attributes proved insufficient for recognition,
their obviously important role suggests they reflect ten or so
out of 20 or 30 crucial dimensions, not ten buried among
100. Does the same principle apply to recognition of real
faces; are key dimensions for a particular face relatively few
in number, say 20 or 30?
The question has not been directly studied, but indirect
evidence suggests an affirmative answer. Harmon {1973) in
another study found that 21 dimensions sufficed to sort very
effectively a population of 256 portraits of white unbearded
males without glasses from 20 to 50 years old. Some
examples of the dimensions are hair from full to bald,
forehead receding- vertical - bulging, nose short-mediumlong. Indeed subjects' estimates of the ten measures most
prominent or differentiating for a particular photograph
served quite reliably to single it out from the population,
despite the contamination of frequent errors in estimating.
Without speaking directly to the process of reflexive recognition of individuals, the findings demonstrate that relatively
few attributes suffice to single an individual out of a large
population, and also that such attributes can be perceptually
judged.
20

Partial Evidence
A study by Goldstein and Mackenberg {1966) established
that normal face recognition can succeed on the basis of
partial evidence. Goldstein and Mackenberg employed a
variety of masks obscuring parts of the face and studied face
recognition in kindergarten, first, and fifth grade children.
The task was to recognize masked photographs of classmates,
photographs which, unmasked, were all recognized two
weeks prior to testing. Exposure from the middle of the nose
up permitted 95% recognition by the fifth graders. Even
exposure from the eyebrows up allowed fifth graders to
recognize 70% of the photographs. The stress laid earlier on
the hair and the hairline as a cue for recognition receives
some support here. Exposure below the center of the nose
yielded only about 45% recognition, as did exposure of a
horizontal bar-shaped region including the eyes and the
bridge of the nose. In summary, it would appear that the face
from the eyebrows up offers a great deal of information for
recognition; both the muzzle area and the face from the
eyebrows to the bridge of nose offer markedly less information and about the same amount, in isolation. Recognition
evidence from the nose is difficult to assess here, as almost all
the masks partly obscured it.

Counter-Evidence
Some encouragement for the role of counter-evidence in
perception of faces comes from a study by Bradshaw and
Wallace {1971). They utilized stimulus materials assembled
with an lndentikit-a collection of transparent overlays
providing a variety of noses, eyes, and other facial features
for the compilation of complete faces; the kit is normally
used in criminal identification work. Subjects were presented
with pairs of faces, the two of each pair sometimes being
identical, or sometimes differing by varying numbers of
features. Subjects were to report as quickly as possible
whether the faces were identical or not. Bradshaw and
Wallace found that responses were more rapid the greater the
number of differing features. This supports a serial featurechecking analysis of the matching task at the expense of a
parallel "gestalt" analysis, where processing time would not
decrease with an increase in differing features. In particular,
the data best fit the hypothesis that the process was
"sequential, self-terminating, without replacement"meaning that the process was one of sequentially testing for
matching features, that it terminated upon finding a discrepancy, and that features once tested were never tested
again for that example.
These results are compatible with the view of face
recognition proposed here; the serial finding underscores the
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importance of individual attributes and the self-termination
is equivalent to the heavy weight accorded counter-evidence.
However, this matching task involved pairs of strange faces
whereas the paradigm task of the present study is the
recognition of extremely familiar faces. Bradshaw and
Wallace recognize this difference themselves. Their study,
nevertheless, demonstrates that the human pe rceptual system
is highly sensitive to, and accords considerable weight to,
mismatches in comparing faces. This sensitivity and weight
plausibly carries over to face recognition, where the stimulus
must in some sense be compared to stored information about
familiar faces.

A GESTALT ALTERNATIVE?
T he argumen t for an attribute-checking model of face
recognition seems to stand in opposition to a gestalt view of
recognition, where the perceptual mechanisms respond not
to a collection of attributes, but to the holistic pattern of
their interrelations. In fact, the two perspectives do not
compete nearly as much as they seem to. A little thought
reveals that the attribute-checking model allows perfectly
well for a gestalt interpretation.
First of all, no specific restrictions have been placed on
what may count as a key attribute. True, the four properties
stressed in t he example, jowls, nose, hairline, and box chin,
are spatially localized in certain parts of the head and might
be called individual features. But this accident of the present
analysis does not disallow properties with ~ mQ_re gestalt
flavor, properties such as the ratios of distances between the
eyes and from eye to mouth, or approximate positions of
features in the oval of the head, or the general shape of the
head dimensionalized in some manner. Indeed, the contour
of the whole seemed to be part of the problem with the
"deliberate miss" in Figure 14.
On this interpretation, the attributes, however gestalt-like,
still describe the physical shape of the face. But perhaps faces
might be encoded in memory and recognized in holistic
terms not directly descriptive of shape, in terms of personality for instance. One person might have a spiteful but lazy
face, another a visage cloyingly .friendly, and so forth. That
faces can be encoded reliably in such terms has been
demonstrated (Secord 1958; Secord and Muthard 1955;
Shoemaker, South, and Lowe 1973). Observers are generally
asked to classify the faces presented in terms of a given
vocabulary or along dimensions such as sincere-insincere. The
classifications are often "objective" within the culture, that
is, much the same from judge to judge. However, there is no
evidence of correlation between attributed personality and a
depicted
person's
actual
personality
(Hochberg
1964:105-11 0).
Such a means of encoding faces may not be especially
effective. Yin (1970), in a study where observers tried to
describe faces in writing and later match faces to. descriptions, found that description of personality did not work
well. In any case, far from being contrary to an attribute
checking process, readings of personality appear to depend
on just the sorts of facial attributes under discussion. For
example, Secord and Muthard, in a study of judgments of
women's faces, found a frequent clustering of three personality attributions, "conceited," "likes men's attention," and

"demanding," which they termed the "gold-digger syndrome." The making of these judgments proved to be highly
correlated positively with a photograph displaying high
eyebrows, bowed lips, visible eyelids, tilted head, and narrow
eyes, and correlated negatively with square face, widened
eyes, untilted head, and straight lips.
A more serious challenge comes from E. H. Gombrich
(1972:26-28) who points out that the particular measures a
face appears to have depend on the whole shape of the face.
For instance, how close together the eyes seem-and therefore how lively or dull the face appears-turns not only on
their objective distance but on how widely the whole face
and hair extends. This stance really presents a synthesis of
the gestalt and attribute-detecting spirits. Acknowledging the
relevance of measures of the face, Gombrich's account points
out that such measures are influenced by the shape of the
whole. Such an interpretation sits comfortably with the
attribute-checking process explained here because that
attribute-checking is done by the human eye. Recognition
research depending on objective measures of human features
would not allow for the gestalt influence. But in research
such as Harmon's or Secord's, or for instance in the use of an
ldentikit, the human eye judges the relevant dimensions and
gestalt influences come into play automatically.
In summary, no genuine conflict obtains between the
gestalt viewpoint and the present description of recognition
as a process of checking certain physical attributes of the
face. Indeed, the gestalt perspective enriches the concept of
how such attributes checking works. This is not to say that
differences never emerge between attribute-checking and
gestalt theories of recognition, but at least such differences
ma ke little trouble for the present argument.

RESEMBLANCE AND RECOGNITION
The available evidence enc ourages the position that face
and caricature recognition are similar processes, depending
on the presence of some among a few key attributes, and on
the absence of contra-indications of key attributes. The
natural step is to conclude that face recognition employs just
those same properties that the caricaturist chooses to
emphasize; he selects these in order to borrow the normal
recognition process.
An alternative interpretation is that caricatures are conventionalized symbols established by the practice of caricaturists within the culture. Indeed, this occasionally
happens. Gombrich (1972: 12-13) has cited a case where
Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's financial wizard, gradually became
represented solely by a high stiff collar. In general, though, a
convention for every person does not allow for recognition
in-caricature of individuals one has never before seen
caricatured, a common event.
A weaker but more plausible version of the convention
theory is that observers have learned - at -a reflexive automatic level-what information caricatures generally provide
and what they leave out. Normal face recognition would use
many more properties than caricatures are careful about. For
a naive viewer, those "extra" properties not captured in
caricatures would act as counter-evidence, blocking recognition. This suggests an experiment. Would naive viewers,
familiar with picturing in general but unfamiliar with
CARICATURE: DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION
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caricatures, fail or succeed in identifying familiar faces from
caricatures? Such an experiment has not been done. Even so,
my bet is that extended adaptation would not be required.
Economy of means in psychological functioning argues that
the extra information provided by accurate depictions over
caricatures is simply extraneous to the recognition process.
The trouble with this tack is that it seems to imply a
discrete, categorical perception of the world. Can it be true
that out of the richness of visual information offered the eye
we draw only a few trends- long noses versus short, weak
chins versus strong. Do we see simply by pigeon-holing?
Surely any such stand contradicts our everyday experience
with the fineness and subtlety of visual discrimination.
Indeed, we know a good deal more about a face than a
caricature would offer. For one thing, we do not mistake
caricatures for accurate conventional portraits; we can
readily point out the exaggerations. Even given a conventional portrait, if we are asked (without the model present)
"what do you think of this resemblance," we can sometimes
point out subtle divergences- the hair too curly, the forehead
a little high, and so forth. From this standpoint, a trendoriented categorical recognition process seems implausible.
The solution lies in realizing that recognition is one thing
and resemblance something else again. Nuances of resemblance are at issue when one already knows the identity of
the depicted face, by being told or by recognizing it.
Recognition involves a rapid reflexive "look-up" system for
identifying faces. Streamlined for function, the system
operates with relatively few categorizations which taken
together differentiate one person from another quickly and
effectively, and without requiring extremely precise scanning
of the stimulus. When recognition is achieved, one may then
find one has available considerable further information about
the face, even information contrary to the stimulus.
Accordingly, we may reflexively recognize a caricature of
the President with straight hair, no bags under the eyes, and
curved eyebrows, even though we know his hair curls a
bit, his eyebrows peak, and his eyes have bags. This is part of
our knowledge, but not part of that knowledge used by the
look-up system. Likewise, we may discover an old friend on
the street, only to realize on second glance that it is someone
else; the results of the reflexive look-up are checked against
the further knowledge made available by the look-up.
In this context, the paradox of caricature recognition
disappears. Though relative to our full perceptual capacities,
caricatures are grossly inaccurate in depicting the shapes of
their subjects, the look-up subsystem exercises much more
generous standards. The caricaturist chooses his exaggeration
not to achieve a convincing resemblance, but to trigger the
look-up system, perhaps to trigger it even more effectively
than the real face. He has the freedom to do this, and to
pursue aims such as humor and interpretation of the
personality at the same time, exactly because there is so little
the look-up system really cares about.

On August 24 Associate Editor Larry Gross brought the following
news story from the Philadelphia Bulletin (8/23/74) to my attention.
Because of its obvious relation to the preceding paper on caricature,
I am taking the liberty of adding it as an extra illustration to the paper
by Perkins. - SW
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Foundation Grant GB-31064 and National Institute of Education
Grant G-003-0169. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily
reflect the position or policy of the National Institute of Education,
and no official endorsement should be inferred.
I thank Howard Gardner and Nelson Goodman for their perceptive
comments on an earlier version; Paul Szep, political cartoonist for the
Boston Glob e , for an enlightening interview on the ins and outs of his
art; Graham Roupas for several useful conversations; and John
Kennedy, who first drew my attention to the problems of caricature.
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